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GENOCIDE DENIAL AND THE LAW:

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
Paul Behrens
University of Edinburgh
Genocide denial carries particular relevance for international law: it is
the negation of international crimes, and it can prepare the ground for new
crimes of this kind. But its criminalization raises concerns as well. The
danger of a clash with human rights, particularly with the freedom of expression, cannot be dismissed lightly. This article explores reasons for and
repercussions of the criminalization of denial. It also investigates alternatives, including the use of truth and reconciliation, and evaluates methods
that focus on direct confrontation of the deniers.
INTRODUCTION

One of the most famous cases in which a court had to discuss allegations of Holocaust denial was unusual in many regards. It was not a case in
which a denier stood in the dock-it was not even a trial in a country that
criminalized denial. It was the 2000 case brought by the author David Irving against the U.S. academic, Deborah Lipstadt, after she had portrayed
him in a book as a Holocaust denier.' The trial, in which Irving sought to
receive compensation for Lipstadt's alleged libel, resulted in his defeat. The
Judge called Irving "anti-semitic" and a "racist," 2 and noted that it seemed
"incontrovertible" that Irving "qualifie[d] as a Holocaust denier." 3
Nearly six years later, Irving found himself in another courtroom-this
time, as a defendant in criminal proceedings. Before the regional court of
Vienna, he stood accused of denying the Holocaust, 4 conduct that is
criminalized under Austrian law.5 But even before the trial began, Irving's
old adversary Lipstadt, made a statement which took some observers by
surprise: when he had been in investigative custody for some time, Lipstadt
called for his release, noting that the author had "spent enough time in
1. See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., Deborah E. Lipstadt, [2000] Q.B. 2000 WL
362478 [hereinafter Irving v. Lipstadt]. The book was DEBORAH LIPSTADT, DENYING
THE HOLOCAUST (Plume 1994).
2. Irving v. Lipstadt, in particular 11 13.105, 13.106.
3. Id. at 1 13.95.
4. Kate Connolly, Irvingjailedfor 3 years after denying Holocaust, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 21, 2006.
5. Verbotsegetz [VerbotsG] [Prohibition Act], 1947, StGBI Nr 13/1945, Art. 1,
§ 3(h), available at http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundes
normen&Gesetzesnummer= 10000207 (Ger.).
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prison." 6 Ultimately, this did not help Irving, who, in February 2006, was
sentenced to three years imprisonment7 (a sentence which was reduced on
appeal'). From Lipstadt's perspective, her statement was not inconsistent
with the position she had taken in 2000. As she put it, in 2000, Irving had
tried to "curtail [her] freedom of speech," 9 and in 2006, her main objection
to Irving's treatment appeared to be based on the impression that he had
been arrested for the exercise of the same right.' 0
And yet, Austria is not the only country that has resorted to sanctions
of the criminal justice system in an attempt to deal with Holocaust and
genocide denial." This raises questions about the rationale underlying these
laws and the hopes with which the legislator associates them. It also allows
for an inquiry into their suitability for the achievement of the stated aims.
But the criminalization of genocide denial also raises specific concerns regarding its compatibility with international law-in particular, with the
human rights commitments of a State resorting to measures of this kind. In
that regard, the right to which Lipstadt referred in 2006-freedom of expression-is not the only right which may face restrictions if a State resorts to the
instruments of criminal law in order to counter activities of denial.
This article seeks to explore these points by providing, in its first part,
a critique of the reasons for criminalization and by investigating in particular their compatibility with international human rights standards and the
efficiency of legislation of this kind. But it also looks, in a second part, at
6. Brendan O'Neill, 'Irving? Let The Guy Go Home,' BBC NEws, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/4578534.stm.
7. Markus Huber, Die Lluterung wird David Irving nicht abgenommen, STUTrGARTER ZEITUNG, Feb. 21, 2006, (Ger.).
8. In December 2006, the Higher Regional Court of Vienna converted the remainder of Irving's prison sentence to a sentence on probation; Irving was consequently
released. Holocaust-LeugnerIrving in Wien kommt auf freien Fu3, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE - GERMAN, Dec. 20, 2006, (Ger.).
9. Neal Conan (anchor) and Professor Lipstadt, Talk of the Nation: Austrian Court
Jails Historian Who Denied Holocaust, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Feb. 21, 2006, (transcript at http://www.npr.org/programs/totn/transcripts/2006/feb/060221.scally.html).
10. O'Neill, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., for Germany, Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code], Nov. 13,
1998, § 130(3), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-stgb/eng
lisch-stgb.html#pl200 (M. Bohlander, trans.) (Ger.) [hereinafter StGB]; for Israel, Denial of Holocaust Prohibition law, 5746-1986, availableat http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Anti-Semitism+and+the+Holocaust/Documents+and+communiques/Denial+of+Holo
caust+-Prohibition-+Law-+5746-1986-.htm (Isr.); for Poland, Act on the Institute of
National Remembrance, Art. 55 in conjunction with Art. 1, Dec. 18, 1998, availableat
http://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-institute/documents/institute-documents/the-act-on-theinstitute-of-national-remembrance (Pol.).
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several alternatives to laws on denial in its "basic form," including modifications to the legal approach, but also the possibility of truth and reconciliation commissions and direct confrontation with the deniers. The final part
of this article offers concluding thoughts on the risks that attach to criminalization and on the efficiency of alternative approaches.
In the context of this article, the term "denialism" is employed to refer
both to the conduct of outright negation and to revisionism. It thus encompasses falsification of information and misinformation about the factual
events underlying the relevant genocide.
While the most prominent targets of legislation on denial are statements negating the Holocaust, some legislative instruments have made reference to more recent events (such as denial of the 1994 massacres in
Rwanda).1 2 This article incorporates a reflection on denialism referring to
these events where this is indicated.
In the context of this article, unless otherwise indicated, the term "genocide" refers to the social concept of this term.1 3 It is thus primarily understood as the historical macro-phenomenon, rather than the conduct of an
individual perpetrator, which formed the basis for the definition of the
crime in the Genocide Convention in the statutes of the international criminal tribunals, and in the statute of the International Criminal Court.1 4 However, it is acknowledged that the very conflation of the two concepts lies at
the root of some of the difficulties that have arisen in the application of
criminalization.1 5

12. See, e.g., Scott Baldauf, American in Rwanda Freed, But Still Faces Genocide
Denial Charge, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 17, 2010, http://www.csmonitor
.com/World/Africa/2010/0617/American-in-Rwanda-freed-but-still-faces-genocide-deni
al-charge; see also infra text accompanying note 55.
13. On this distinction, see Stefan Kirsch, The social and the legal concept of
genocide, ELEMENTS OF GENOCIDE, 7 et seq. (Paul Behrens and Ralph Henham eds.,
2012).
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICCSt]; S.C. Res. 827 U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTYSt]; S.C. Res. 955 U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTRSt]. For the codification in the Genocide Convention, see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(codification in the Genocide Convention) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
15. An example is the Erlinder case in which the Rwandan prosecution failed to
engage in a clear differentiation, see infra text accompanying note 59.

30

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

I.

A

[Vol. 21

CRITIQUE OF LAWS AGAINST GENOCIDE
AND HOLOCAUST DENIAL

Identifying the Rationale - Questions of Harm and Morals
The very notion of "law" represents more than an accumulation of
rules; if that were not the case, it would not be much different from the
rules of hierarchy governing a criminal organization. Nor could any State
be said to possess an effective legal system if obedience to the law relied on
it being enforced every step of the way. The reason why law tends to
"work" is that the population on the whole is willing to accept it, and the
reason the population accepts it is because it is understood as embodying, at
least on a most basic level, a moral mandate.16
That is particularly true where rules of criminal law are concerned;
legal moralism represents one of the principal ways of justifying its existence.' 7 A system that allows for significant intrusions into a citizen's integrity-including deprivation of his liberty, even his life-calls for a strong
moral mandate as its basis. The sharp sanctions that a State feels entitled to
adopt receive their justification through the fact that the perpetrator's conduct deviated manifestly from fundamental values of society. Legal moralism has attracted criticism in the past,' 8 but, at the very least, it is difficult to
deny that it is one of the functions of criminal law to reassert the value
system which the State has established for itself.
Where criminalization of denialism is concerned, the appeal of legal
moralism is apparent. From this perspective, the law conveys a message of
moral character: if a society has chosen this route, it has elevated truth and
the memory of the events to the level of values worthy of the protection of
the criminal justice system. In States in which the perpetrators of these
crimes first came to power, laws of this kind may be intended to carry a
message of special meaning: not only that of renunciation of the policies of
the past, but also of solidarity with the victims.
It is a different question whether these aspirations are achieved and
whether criminal law is the best tool to do so. For one, it is not always clear
whether the law does indeed convey a message of solidarity. Its message
may go in the opposite direction: i.e., that society would not be inclined to
16. For a different view on the underlying intentions of the law, cf

RICHARD

(1970).
17. On this, see C.M.V. CLARKSON, H.M. KEATING & S.R. CUNNINGHAM, CLARKSON & KEATING'S CRIMINAL LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 5 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME

CLARKSON].

18. Often with good reason, see Tony Honor6, The Dependence of Morality on
Law, 13

OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.

1, in particular 4, 9 (Spring 1993).
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show solidarity were it not for the cudgel of the law. The value system that
is thus promoted may look quite different to an impartial observer than to
the drafters of such legislation.
Furthermore, criminalization of denial is, by necessity, exclusive; even
if the message of solidarity were adequately conveyed, it would be solidarity only with victims of particular crimes.
One example is the European Framework Decision, which addresses
denialism in the context of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war
crimes, but only when those crimes were directed "against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour,
religion, descent or national or ethnic origin."I 9 The fact that victims defined, for example, by their political beliefs are not covered by the Decision, led to the somewhat embarrassing situation that the Council of the
European Union, in a press release, had to assure observers that it still "de20
plore[d] all of these crimes."
There is another aspect that raises questions about legal moralism as
the rationale underlying criminalization. The invocation of legal moralism
carries the danger that the prevailing moral framework of a particular society appears as an independent justification, separate from the value system
of the international community in which the State is embedded. But a
State's incorporation into that system presupposes acceptance of the system's fundamental values, which are thus capable of giving shape to the
moral message behind the relevant legal provision and may lead to a restriction or expansion of its scope. Chief among these are the human rights
whose protection the State owes to individuals under its jurisdiction. As
these are questions that come into play not only where legal moralism is
2
concerned, it appears appropriate to consider them in a separate section. 1

19. Council Framework Decision of the Council of 28 November 2008 on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law 2008/913/JHA, art. 1(1)(c) 2008 O.J. (328) 55 [hereinafter Framework
Decision].
20. Council "I" Item Note (EU) No. 11523/07, July 19, 2007, available at http://
register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st 11/stl 1523.enO7.pdf. For similarly restrictive
norms, see StGB, supra note 11, s 130(3) and Loi 90-615 du July 13, 1990 tendant a
r6primer tout acte raciste, antisdmite ou xenophobe [The Gayssot Act], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], July 14, 1990;
Jacqueline Lechtholz-Zey, The Laws Banning Genocide Denial, 9 GENOCIDE PREVENTION Now, n. 22 (Winter 2012) http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Home/GPNISSUES/GPNBuIletinLAWSAGAINSTDENIALSpecialSection9/tabid/1 64/ctl/DisplayAr
ticle/mid/97 1/aid/470/Default.aspx.
21. See infra text accompanying note 34.
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Legal moralism is often joined by another consideration: the understanding that criminal law finds its rationale in the need to punish perpetrators of harm. 22 It is a perspective whose force derives from the very
foundations of civil society: the assumption of society's right to exist implies a right of protection against those engaged in harming it.
The significance of the harm principle as a rationale for the criminalization of denialism is manifested in several ways. For one, denialism has a
direct impact on the surviving victims. The precise nature of that impact
may vary and will in some cases include both psychological and physical
damage. In all cases, however, denying or minimising the suffering of the
victims targets the dignity of the survivors, and it appears appropriate in this
context to consider such conduct akin to criminal insult. 23
But the fact has also been emphasized that the consequences of such conduct can extend beyond this. Given the frequently racist agenda that underlies denial, 2 4 the possibility cannot be excluded that this activity carries a
discriminatory message for the target audience-and this indeed often lies at
the heart of the conduct. This was a point that the Spanish government
outlined in the case of Pedro Varela Geiss, a bookseller who was charged
with the distribution of material that "denied, trivialized or justified" the
Holocaust. 25 Counsel for the government pointed out that "professing [ ... ]
doctrines" of genocide denial might create an environment that "starts with
legal discrimination to the access to public positions and professions," followed by the encouragement of the emigration of parts of the population,
and then spreading to "all fields of human coexistence until [it reaches] the
extremes of extermination and annihilation well documented by History." 26
Denialism, if this view were followed, carries the seed for the commission of further international crimes. It is not an entirely theoretical argument: the fact may be recalled that the Iranian President Ahmadinejad, at
the 2006 "Holocaust Review Conference," to which he had invited some of

22. See CLARKSON, supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., the way in which the concept of "insults" was approached in
Grigoriades v. Greece, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7-8, ¶24 (1997) and similarly, in Germany,
HERBERT TRONDLE, STRAFGESETZBUCH UND NEBENGESETZE, 987 at marginal I and 2
(1997).
24. Cf Russell L. Weaver et al., Holocaust Denial and Governmentally Declared
"Truth": French and American Perspectives, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 495, 512 (2009).
25. Pablo Salvador Coderch & Antoni Rubf Puig, Genocide Denial and Freedom
of Speech, INDRET 13, http://www.indret.com/pdf/591_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2014).
26. Id. at 16.
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the world's most prominent deniers, 27 made use of this platform to repeat
his verbal aggression against Israel, stating that "the Zionist regime [will]
soon be wiped out." 2 8
From this perspective, the harm principle appears to offer a sound basis for the criminalization of denialism. At the same time, the exceptionally
intrusive nature of criminal law also demands that a particularly high
threshold has to be imposed on conduct which is to fall within its framework. The mere possibility of certain harm cannot suffice; what is required
is that such harm is the product of this type of conduct and that such conduct indeed calls for criminalization on this basis.
This raises questions about the conduct at the root of the harm that the
legislation seeks to avoid. Both in the cases of Varela Geiss and of
Ahmadinejad, the argument can be advanced that the relevant conduct is
not constituted solely by the activity of denial as such (termed here, "basic
denial"). The reason that the relevant harm could materialize was the fact
that the statements of denial were accessible to a wider audience.
If "basic denial" as such were criminalized, it would suffice that the
relevant words were spoken in the privacy of the perpetrator's living room
(perchance overheard by a neighbor), or to a very limited audience that may
even be opposed to the perpetrator's views. Even in these situations harm
exists if it is accepted that the dignity of a relevant group (such as the surviving victims) has come under attack. But the assumption that the law
might be the appropriate means to regulate dignity has faced criticism in the
past.
Knechtle, when discussing the EU Framework Decision on racism and
xenophobia, and its provisions on denialism, 29 expressed the view that dignity "comes from within-well beyond the reach of the law" and suggested
that human dignity is best recognized by the State if it "respect[s] the individual's right to speak." 0
In this generalized form, this statement is open to criticism: just as a
State granting unbridled liberty ends up promoting not its weakest citizens,
but its greatest bullies, a State granting unbridled freedom of speech ends
up supporting not those who speak the truth, but those who shout the
loudest. Yet it is true that laws outlawing denial may generate a counter27. Top Academics, PoliticalLeaders Seek "Incitement to Genocide" Charges
Against Iran, President Ahmadinejad, U.S. FED. NEws SERV., Dec. 12, 2006, http://
www.highbeam.com/doc/I P3-1179835351.html.
28. Id.
29. Cf Framework Decision art. 1(1)(c), supra note 19.
30. John C. Knechtle, Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European Union, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 43 (2008).
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productive impact: instead of accepting as self-evident that victims of international crimes exist and are deserving of dignity, the message is now advanced that these facts live in such an imperiled state that they require the
crutch of the law. Whether this enhances the dignity of the survivors is at
best questionable.
If, on the other hand, the offensive conduct were understood in a more
restrictive sense-encompassing not every form of basic denial, but at least
the dissemination of this message to an audience-it would be possible to
capture additional harmful consequences through the law. 3 1Even if the immediate audience did not show any direct reaction to the message, it is
possible that the message has a persuasive effect upon them and that they in
turn would be encouraged to engage in denialism. In this sense, denial is
capable of creating secondary harm.3 2 Spreading of the word can be seen as
giving rise to a wide range of consequences, from the establishment of a
racist climate to the effects to which the Spanish government referred in
Varela Geiss. 3 3
But the acceptance of secondary harm carries its own difficulties. The
existence of a chain of causation between conduct and consequence is not
always inevitable; intervening steps are often required to achieve the result
that the law seeks to prevent. Criminal law, which relies on secondary harm
as its rationale, is a dangerous beast: once it has been accepted as justification in one case, it may easily be employed in other contexts where the
motivation behind a particular law may be based on partisan political views
rather than the genuine need to prevent specified damage.
Criminalizationand Human Rights
The possibility that criminalization may have a restrictive impact on
human rights must be considered one of the key issues in the debate on this
issue.
Freedom of expression occupies a prominent place in that discourse. 34
While this right is incorporated in all of the leading comprehensive human

31. See infra text accompanying note 77 et seq.
32. On secondary harms in particular, see Anthony Dillof, Modal Retributivism:A
Theory of Sanctionsfor Attempts and OtherCriminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647,
662 (2011).
33. See supra text accompanying note 26.

34. Lipstadt makes reference to the freedom of speech in her 2006 comments, a
freedom which is incorporated into the freedom of expression. See supratext accompanying note 10.
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rights treaties, 35 the interpretation of its scope has triggered considerable
controversy. In this context, the question in particular arises whether the
denial of certain facts falls within its remit at all. The European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR") found in Lingens v. Austria that "a careful distinction needs to be made between facts and value-judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value-judgments is
not susceptible of proof." 36
That appears to be a somewhat simplified understanding, particularly
in light of the difficulties that the "demonstration of facts" can occasionally
encounter. One may consider a situation in which bones are unearthed amid
allegations that international crimes have taken place. The need for interpretative assessment begins with the very question whether the remains are
human. If uniforms are found, can they positively be said to belong to one
particular party to a conflict? Can a positive assessment be made that death
was caused in a violent way? And if that is done, can a positive assessment
be made as to the authors of the killings? If these questions are seen
"merely" as matters of fact, then a State would be entitled to regulate statements on any of these points. 37 But the truth is that even assertions of fact
presuppose assessment; and the fine distinctions that the ECHR suggested
are not always easy to draw. It is therefore not surprising that not all courts
have adopted the same approach.
When Ernst Zundel was charged in Canada with the offense of spreading false news 38 after he had published a pamphlet denying the Holocaust,
the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the relevant criminal law was unconstitutional because it violated Article 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights art.
13(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(1), Apr. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
36. Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 1986 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) para. 46,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-57523.
37. That the authorship even of mass killings remains unclear, is not an unusual
occurrence, especially in civil war. For a recent example, see Oliver Holmes & Mariam
Karouny, Dozens of Syrian civilians killed in Homs, The INDEPENDENT, Mar. 12, 2012,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/dozens-of-syrian-civilianskilled-in-homs-7562455.html.
38. S. 181 of the Canadian Criminal Code made it an offense to wilfully publish
"a statement, tale or news that [the perpetrator] knows is false and causes or is likely to
cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an indictable offense and liable
to imprisonment [ . . . ]," R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 732 (headnote) (Can.),
http://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/libertadexpresion/docs/leotroscanada/r.%20v.%20
zundel.htm [hereinafter Zundel].
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Rights and Freedoms (guaranteeing "freedom of thought, belief, opinion
and expression"). 39 The majority opinion found that the distinction between
"an assertion of fact, as opposed to an expression of opinion, is a question
of great difficulty and the question of falsity of a statement is often a matter
of debate." 4 0 But even the three dissenting judges declared that the "deliberate publication of statements known to be false, which convey meaning in a
non-violent form, [fell] within the scope of s. 2(b)." 4 1
And when the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez considered the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, a statute that made it an offense for
anyone to pretend to have received certain military medals, 42 it confirmed
that the Act violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (protecting, inter alia, freedom of speech). 4 3 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Breyer took exception to the argument that false factual statements should
enjoy no protection at all. Breyer emphasised that these statements too can
"serve useful human objectives" and referred to a number of examples, including attempts to "prevent embarrassment" and "protect privacy," but
also the promotion of "a form of thought that ultimately helps to realize the
truth" through an "examination of false statements (even if made deliberately to mislead).""
This is a preferable approach. In the field of human rights, it is also a
view that demonstrates greater compatibility with the literal understanding
of the right of freedom of expression, whose protection, as enshrined in the
leading human rights treaties, clearly extends beyond the freedom of expression of "opinions."45
That does not mean that this emerging freedom is unrestricted. The
ECHR does allow for limitations which the relevant State can adopt for
various reasons, including "the protection of morals" and the "protection of
39. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.1I (Can.).
40. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 734.

41. Id. at 735.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b).
43. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2564 (2012).
44. Id. at 2541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
45. ECHR, art 10(1) supra note 35 (protecting "freedom of expression" and stating that that right "shall include" the freedom to hold opinions); ICCPR art. 19, supra
note 35, (containing the "right to hold opinions" and the "right to freedom of expression" as separate rights [in the first two paragraphs of that article]); ACHR arts. 13(1),
13(3), supra note 35 (Article 13[1] merely refering to "freedom of thought and expression"; the freedom to hold opinions is implied in Article 13(3), which prohibits the
restriction of the right of expression through "any [ ... ] means tending to impede the
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.").
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the reputation or rights of others." 46 The same exceptions are envisaged in
the ICCPR 47 and the ACHR. 4 8 Criminalization is therefore still possible, but
it has to comply with the specific conditions that attach to measures of this
kind. In particular, limitations of freedom of expression are not justified if
they are not necessary to safeguard the protected interest. 49 This introduces
a consideration of proportionality,5 0 and laws on denialism therefore have to
take the various barriers this principle imposes. 5 ' A law is thus not "necessary" in view of its declared aim if it is not a suitable means to achieve that
aim in the first place, and it is also not "necessary" if there were alternatives, which would have been equally (or more) effective but would have
imposed less of a restriction on the affected human right.
Laws against denialism raise questions in both regards, and the criticism which they trigger becomes clearer when these aspects are discussed
in more detail. The question of efficiency will be addressed in the next
subsection, and available alternative options will be discussed in Section II.
Freedom of expression is not the only human right that criminalization
may affect. A recent case in Rwanda demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, legislation of this kind might impact on the rights of defendants in
a criminal trial. The case concerned the American lawyer Peter Erlinder,
who was defense counsel for Aloys Ntabakuze before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 52 Erlinder had also intended to work
on the defense team for Victoire Umuhoza, a Rwandan opposition leader,
53
who had been arrested on the charge of promoting genocide ideology.
When Erlinder arrived in Rwanda to take up his work for Umuhoza, he
54
himself was arrested on charges of genocide denial.
46. ECHR art. 10(2), supra note 35.
47. ICCPR art. 19(3), supra note 35.
48. ACHR art. 13(2), supra note 35.
49. ECHR art. 10(2), supra note 35 (requiring such limitations to be "necessary in
a democratic society"); ICCPR art. 19, supra note 35 (merely stipulating that the limitations be necessary); ACHR art. 13, supra note 35 (stating that the limitations can only
be imposed "to the extent necessary" to protect the competing rights).
50. See Soltysyak v. Russia App. No. 4663/05, 2011 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) para. 48,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/docx/00 1-112367.
51. See Paul Behrens, Diplomatic Interference and Competing Interests in International Law, 82 BYIL 226 et seq. (2012).
52. Edmund Kagire & Patrick Condon, Rwandan police arrest US lawyer, AssoCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, May 29, 2010, availableat http://www.highbeam.com/
doc/lAl-c2245a8388c84394bcOca57a23a03fc3.html.
53. Rwanda arrests US lawyer Erlinderfor genocide denial, BBC NEWS, May 28,
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10187580.
54. Id.
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Following the genocide of 1994, Rwanda engaged in a campaign
against conduct that it considered to fall under the headings of "divisionism" or "genocide ideology," culminating in Law No. 18/2008 on the punishment of genocide ideology.55 The law made reference to various forms of
conduct under the crime of "genocide ideology," including the creation of
"confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred." 5 6 It faced considerable criticism for the vague language it employed and for the consequences of its application, 57 including its perceived use to muzzle political
opposition.58
In the case of Erlinder, the Rwandan prosecution authorities, arguing
their case before the High Court in Gasabo, specifically referred to his work
at the ICTR and reportedly said that "Carl Peter Erlinder denied and minimized the genocide by stating that the soldiers he was defending neither
planned nor carried out the genocide." 59
Erlinder's arrest evoked strong criticism-the ICTR requested his immediate release, 60 and the American Bar Association called upon Rwanda to
observe the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 6 1 which impose
on governments the obligation to ensure that lawyers are "able to perform
all of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference." 62

55. Safer to Stay Silent, AMNESTY

ter

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL]

INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS,

2010 [hereinaf-

(describing the law, pp. 13-14; on the law's background,

pp. 10-11).
56. Id. at 14; Law 18/2008 Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Ideology, July 23, 2008, Official Gazette No. 20 [O.G.], Oct. 15, 2008, art. 3(2).
57. See Law and Reality: Progress ofjudicial reform in Rwanda, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, July 26, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/07/25/law-and-reality;
see

also AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL,

supra note 55, at 14 (documenting the fact that the law

employs terms such as "[m]arginalising, laughing at one's misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising" to describe conduct which fulfilled the characteristics of "genocide ideology").
58. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 55, at 20-22.
59. Office of the Registrar of the ICTR, Note Verbale to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Cooperationof the Government of Rwanda, ICTR/RO/06/10/175, June 15,
2010.

60. Id.
61. Statements of Support of Prof Erlinder, WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF
June 3, 2010, http://web.wmitchell.edu/news/2010/06/statements-of-support-forprof-erlinder.
62. UN BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 16(a), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990).
LAW,
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The arrest also raised particular concerns in relation to human rights-including not only those of Erlinder, 63 but also those of his clients at the
ICTR.
If genocide denial laws could be applied in on-going criminal trials to
the effect that defendants charged with genocide could not assert their innocence, the consequences would be staggering: laws of this kind would make
a mockery of the presumption of innocence, which all leading human rights
treaties seek to protect." The possibility that the criminalization of genocide denial could result in trials in which the only option for the accused is a
65
guilty plea conjures up an image of Kafkaesque (or Cardassian ) justice
that must, at the very least, be considered deeply troubling.
The Efficiency of Laws Against Genocide and Holocaust Denial
A particular criticism with regard to criminalization is founded on the
consideration that such legislation is not efficient if measured by its stated
aims. The effect may indeed go in the opposite direction: in the court case
of the Canadian Holocaust denier Keegstra, the dissenting justices pointed
out that the criminal trial process not only attracts "extensive media coverage and confer[s] on the accused publicity for his dubious causes, it may
even bring him sympathy." 66
It is true that leaders of the movement are often motivated by different
reasons than their disciples. But where the efficiency of criminalization is
concerned, questions can be raised about the impact that such legislation
has on either group.
Where the prominent faces in the field of denialism are concerned, the
evidence is not encouraging. David Irving's spell in prison did not seem to
have led to a significant change in his views: upon his return, he reportedly
stated that he had been "obliged to show remorse" during his trial, but had
now decided he had "no need any longer to show remorse." 67 And in Octo63. Id. at 23 (The UN Basic Principles emphasise that lawyers "like other citizens
are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly[ . . . ].").
6

The UN Basic Principles emphasise that lawyers "like other citizens are entitled to

freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly[ . . . ]." Id. at 23.
64. ECHR art. 6(2), supra note 35; ICCPR art. 14(2), supra note 35; ACHR art.
8(2), supra note 35.
65. Star Trek: Deep Space Nine: Tribunal (Paramount television broadcast 1994)
(Cardassia Prime is a fictitious world in whose justice system defendants are presumed
guilty from the outset and in which the purpose of a trial is "to demonstrate the futility
of behaviour contrary to good order.").
66. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
67. Mark Oliver et al., Irving shows little remorse on return to UK, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/dec/22/thefarright.austria.
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ber 2006, when the French denier Faurisson, received a suspended prison
sentence,68 this sanction did little to deter him from attending, two months
later, the Iranian conference on "Review of the Holocaust." 69
It is a fallacy to believe that criminal sanctions are capable of changing
the opinions of those who must be held responsible for the creation of denialism. The fact that the State has resorted to instruments of criminal justice
rather plays into their belief system, in which they stand at the receiving

end of a conspiracy to suppress their version about the underlying international crimes.
Even where followers of the movement are concerned, supporters of
criminalization have yet to furnish proof for the efficiency of legal sanctions. At least where prison sentences are concerned, the effect of the sanctions may well go in the opposite direction. In some prisons, deniers have a
good chance of being exposed to (continued) propaganda from the extreme
right: in the German State of Brandenburg, for instance, it was reported in
2012 that some 25 to 30% of prisoners in young offender institutions veered
towards the mindset of the extreme right. 70
And extremist organizations are keen to stay in touch with their imprisoned members, thus strengthening the ideological commitment of the
latter and ensuring their continued integration in that scene7 ' (the "White
Prisoner and Supporter Day," for instance, aims to offer worldwide assistance to prisoners of the extreme right). 72 Furthermore, there is evidence
that to those who already are in the extremist camp, imprisonment may

68. Le ndgationnisteRobert Faurissona itd condamnda trois mois de prison avec
sursis, LE MONDE, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2006/10/03/lenegationniste-robert-faurisson-a-ete-condamne-a-trois-mois-de-prison-avec-sursis_8195
90_3224.html.
69. See supra text accompanying note 27; Robert Tait, Holocaustdeniers gather
in Iranfor "scientific" conference, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/12/iran.israel.
70. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHE UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 17/8983, 2
(Ger.) (in the young offender institution in Halle (Saxony-Anhalt, Germany), some 20%
of inmates were estimated to fall in this category); see also Werner Nickolai, Bericht
fiber eine Fahrtnach Auschwitz mit rechtsradikalenjugendlichen Strafgefangenen, AUF
DEM WEG ZUR NATION? UBER DEUTSCHE IDENTITAT NACH AUSCHWITZ 123 (Hajo Funke
& Dietrich Neuhaus eds., 1989).
71. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 70, at 7.
72. Kathrin Haimerl, Wolle, Halt Durch! SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ONLINE, Jan. 14,

2012, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/braune-solidaritaet-mit-nsu-verdaechtigenwolle-halt-durch- 1.1256785.
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appear not so much as a deterring experience, but as a further step on the
"career ladder" of their peer group.73
Weaver, Delpierre, and Boissier, speaking about the French Loi Gayssot (a statute dealing with denialism), concede that the law is unlikely to
change the mindset of the deniers, but express the hope that it would "affect
those who might be tempted to join the Holocaust deniers." 74 In other
words, the underlying intention of a law of that kind might be directed at
general, rather than specific, deterrence.
But even in that regard, it is difficult to measure the success rate of
criminalization. If the general public refrains from denialism, does it do so
because of the threat of criminal sanctions or because the actual facts are
overwhelming? And even if the law were the reason for this attitude, can it
be said that its aims have indeed reached the man on the Clapham omnibus?
Is it respect for the victims that make him guard his language, or respect for
the law?
The most significant concern, however, is based upon the fact that
some of the difficulties that attach to specific deterrence, apply to general
deterrence as well: in particular, the consideration that laws of this kind
may have the very effect which criminalization seeks to prevent. In her
2006 interview, Lipstadt voiced the concem that criminalization turns "Holocaust denial into forbidden fruit, and make[s] it more attractive to people
who want to [ . . . ] challenge the system.""7 But it is the very characteristic
of forbidden fruit that it tempts not only those who want to challenge the
system anyway, but even those who would be perfectly content to refrain
from such experiments, were it not for the lure of the taboo.
II.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINALIZATION OF "BASIC DENIAL"

A Modified Legal Approach
If criminalization of "basic denial" has shortcomings, the question
arises whether viable alternatives exist to tackle denialism. The extensive
nature of some laws on revision and denial 76 suggests that a modification of

&

73. See Werner Nickolai, Warum den Rechtsextremisten mit Strafvollzug nicht zu
begegnen ist, SOZIALER AUSSCHLUSS DURCH EINSCHLUSS 183 (Werner Nickolai
Richard Reindl eds., 2001).
74. Weaver, supra note 24, at 495. On the Loi Gayssot, see The Gayssot Act,
supra note 20.
75. O'Neill, supra note 6.
76. For the Rwandan example, supra text accompanying note 55 et seq.
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the legal approach might offer a way forward: in particular, by restricting
the scope while retaining the advantages of the legal sanction.7 7
Such limitations have been suggested in the past. Knechtle, for one,
proposed the restriction of the applicability of such laws to societies in
which they can be expected to have particular relevance ("subject societies").7 8 Criminalization of Holocaust denial would thus be suitable for Germany, but inappropriate for Indonesia; criminalization of the denial of the
crimes committed during the occupation of East Timor would be "appropriate for Indonesia and/or East Timor, but not Germany." 79
It is an approach, however, that comes with certain weaknesses. For
one, it is not always easy to determine what exactly a "subject society" is.
The society from which the perpetrator came will often be located in a
different State from that of the victim society. The place of the commission
of the crime will often be the latter State, but it may be a strange (and
insulting) suggestion that it is these communities that need a law against
denial.
The State of the perpetrator might be a questionable starting point as
well. Given the increased significance of international mercenaries and
soldiers of fortune, the "State of the perpetrator" may well be a State whose
population shares the citizenship of the perpetrator, but had no real link to
the crimes and was in fact fundamentally opposed to them.80
Secondly, the fact that certain atrocities may be of particular relevance
to certain societies does not yet answer the question whether laws on denialism are appropriate or indeed necessary. Much in this regard depends
upon the way in which the relevant society has dealt with the memory of
the atrocities, including the recognition given to the suffering of the victims
and the acknowledgment or lack of acknowledgment generally accorded to
deniers.
Thirdly, why should denial of the suffering of the East Timorese not be
a crime in Germany? Why should Holocaust denial not be a crime in Indonesia? The understanding that some forms of conduct are of concern to the
entire international community has been a cornerstone of international crim77.
note 18,
78.
79.

For a discussion of the perceived advantages, see supra text accompanying
and after note 28.
Knechtle, supra note 30, at 52.
Id. at 52-53.

80. The Ruggiu case may be recalled: Ruggiu was a Belgian journalist, who
worked for the RTLM (Radio-Tdldvision Libre de Milles Collines) in Rwanda in
1994-a station, which exhorted the Hutus to actions against the Tutis. In 2000, Ruggiu
was found guilty of direct and public incitement to genocide and the crime against
humanity of persecution. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-1 (June 1, 2000),
VI. Verdict.
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inal justice since Nuremberg. From this perspective, the suggestion that the
protection of the dignity and the memory of the survivors should be a matter of relevance only to "subject societies" is not a solution; it is an unjustifiably retrograde development.
If this approach remains open to criticism, the question can be asked
whether restrictions to the substance of the law offer a better option.
This is a path that several States have adopted in their legislation. Sec8
tion 130(3) of the German Criminal Code does address denialism, ' but
there are additional elements: such conduct must have been carried out
"publicly or in a meeting," and it must have been committed "in a manner
capable of disturbing the public peace." 82 It is an option that appears more
feasible than the criminalization of some forms of speech per se. In Alvarez,
Justice Breyer accepted that certain laws prohibiting false statements did
exist in the United States, but added that they tended to "limit the scope of
their application, sometimes by requiring proof of specific harm to identifiable victims," sometimes by "limiting the prohibited lies to those that are
particularly likely to produce harm." 8 3 Examples he cited were statutes on
defamation, fraud, and perjury. 84
This approach carries certain advantages. The element of harm would
certainly be easier to identify in this scenario than in cases of "basic denial"; and this in turn facilitates a justification of criminalization that emphasises the "need" for laws of this kind.
But it is worth noting that even laws in which the actus reus is extended to cover additional harm have not always found favour in the courts.
In Zundel, the Canadian law (which likewise required additional elements
of the crime85) was still held to violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, although it must be said that the particularly vague way
6
in which the provision had been phrased contributed to its downfall.
The restriction of the scope of the law certainly does not relieve the
lawmaker from the need to comply with the requirements of human rights,
of which specificity of the restricting law is one. 87 It also remains necessary
to examine the various rights that may be affected by laws of this kind. In
81. See supra note 11.

82. Id. at 130(3); see also Framwork Decision art. 1(1)(c), (d), supra note 19. The
Canadian provision in the Zundel case likewise referred to the publication of such statements as an additional requirement. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 732, headnote.
83. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. At 2541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
84. Id.; see also Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 736 (Gonthier, Cory and lacobucci JJ.,
dissenting).
85. See supra note 38.
86. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 734.

87. See, e.g., Grigoriades, para. 37.
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cases like that of Erlinder,88 it might well be possible that a defense counsel's statement that his clients did not commit genocide causes a public
disturbance in a State whose population had been affected by the crimes in
question. Yet, it is his positive duty to act in this manner if his client wishes
to assert his innocence. The framers of criminal law thus have to ensure that
the substance of these fundamental rights of defendants and defense counsels is preserved.
Subject to these caveats, however, laws that extend the actus reus to
cover additional harm have a greater capacity of avoiding the human rights
concerns which were outlined above.
At the same time, their core character is different from that of the
criminalization of "basic denial." The protection of memory and dignity of
the victims becomes a secondary aspect. These measures are, in essence,
laws on public order offenses.
Truth and Reconciliation
The establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions has frequently taken place in communities recently emerged from situations in
which international crimes were committed on a large scale (South Africa
being the most prominent example), 89 and they are thus chiefly considered
in the context of transitional justice. However, given the particular focus on
the establishment of "truth," it is also possible to understand these mechanisms as alternatives to the criminalization of denialism. In this context,
truth and reconciliation has certain advantages over the legal option.
For one, these commissions represent a community effort at identifying the historical record. As institutions which involve both victims and
perpetrators in their work and typically operate on a large scale, 90 they stand
a good chance of exercising an impact on society as a whole. They thus
offer a basis for the internalization of the memory of these events and enable the community to reach acceptance on the record of the relevant
situation. 91
What is more: society has the opportunity of hearing a first-hand account of the events (as opposed to only specific elements of the crimes)
from the perpetrators themselves. The weakness of denialism tends to be
88. See supra text accompanying note 52 et seq.
89. See Olivia Lin, Demythologizing Restorative Justice:South Africa's Truth and
ReconciliationCommission and Rwanda's GacacaCourts in Context, 12 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 42 (2005).
90. See id. at 61.
91. See John Shamsey, 80 Years Too Late: The InternationalCriminalCourtAnd
The 20th Century's First Genocide, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y 378 (2002).
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particularly apparent where its supporters have to deal with statements
made by the authors of the underlying crimes.
At the same time, this particular aspect might prove to be a doubleedged sword. At least in situations where the South African model is taken
as a template, testimony provided by perpetrators might still be open to
attack for the very reason that amnesty was available to some of those who
made "full disclosure" of their deeds. 92 In those circumstances, the question
will unavoidably arise whether the perpetrators' statements were deliberately phrased in a way that they considered to be in compliance with the
expectations of the commission. 93
Even the "community effort" underlying truth and reconciliation raises
questions. It was one of the defining features of the South African model
that victims participated in the sessions and recounted their sufferings. 94
That, however, presupposes an initiative on the part of the victims, which
cannot always be expected. In situations of past genocides, it would not be
difficult to understand the refusal of victims to participate in the same institution as their former oppressors. One of the identified purposes of
criminalization-the expression of society's solidarity with the victims-may
here appear to be relegated to second place: it is the attempt to reconstruct
society and effect "healing," which takes centre stage.
A further problem arises from the fact that not all States emerging
from international crimes allow for a clear distinction between "victim societies" and "perpetrator societies." In the modern age, the underlying crimes
are often the last stage in a long-standing civil war in which the allocation
of the roles of victim and perpetrator might depend on little more than military fortune. But if that is the case, the determination of the "accurate"
historical record can be difficult: the danger exists that perpetrators instead
seek to convey their understanding of "truth,"95 and that the proceedings
become a political battleground, leaving a dispassionate seeker of truth with
96
little more than the question of Pilate.
92. Lin, supra note 89, at 60.
93. See id. at 66.
94. See id. at 60.
95. See Manouri Muttetuwegama, in

TRUTH COMMISSIONS:

A

COMPARATIVE

As-

SESSMENT. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DISCUSSION HELD AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL IN

1996, 16 (1997) (Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1997) (with regard
to Sinhalese factions in Sri Lanka).
96. "What is truth?" John 18:38. The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission showed awareness of the existence of different meanings of truth. See
RICHARD A WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
36 (2001).
MAY
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Yet for all the difficulties it has to negotiate, the concept of truth and
reconciliation must be credited with the fact that it appreciates the significance of truth not only for individual victims, but for society as a whole. It
is a direct approach, which, by confronting perpetrators with the accounts of
victims, does not offer them an easy flight into the realm of denial.
Confronting the Deniers
It would be wrong to say that academic experts and survivors of the
relevant crimes have always eschewed direct confrontation with deniers. 97
Nor could it be said that these approaches are without merit. It is one of the
weaknesses of criminalization that it seemingly lends force to the deniers
who argue that the other side has no reasons to advance and is afraid to join
the discussion. 98
But not everybody agrees on the usefulness of this approach. Lipstadt's statement that debating deniers "would be like trying to nail a glob
of jelly to the wall," has gained some popularity in this context. 99 The apparent problem lies in the fact that, if a partner in conversation refuses to
acknowledge logical reasoning-or even to listen to the other side-the
very foundations of meaningful discourse are missing.
Lipstadt highlights a different approach-to her, it is more helpful to
address the general public and to engage in educational efforts. 00 While
this is certainly an indispensable aspect of any comprehensive effort to deal
with genocide denial, the question remains whether one method need exclude the other. Some initiatives have adopted a combined approach; "The
Nizkor Project" for instance, offers a huge online archive on documents on
the Holocaust and on the activities of deniers, and thus represents an impor0
But it also engages directly with the deniers: it
tant educational effort.o'
features an extensive section that provides a point-by-point response to the
main questions raised by the Institute for Historical Review1 02 (one of the
97. See for instance the debate between the historian Robert Gerwarth and David
Irving on Irish television; John Lawrence, Irving speech to college society cancelled,
THE IRISH TIMES, March 8, 2008. See also Lipstadt, supra note 1, at 138-41 (referring to
an instance of survivors confronting deniers with evidence).
98. Cf Knechtle, supra note 30, at 64.
99. Lipstadt, supra note 1, at 221.
100. Id. at 222.
101. The project's website is available at http://www.nizkor.org. On The Nizkor
Project, see John Schwartz, With Innovative Use, the Web Empowers the FirstAmendment, WASH. POST, July 15, 1996, at F19.
102. THE IHR's QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AND NIZKOR's REPONSEs. A REPLY TO
THE IHR / ZONDEL'S "66 Q&A," THE NIZKOR PROJECT, at http://www.nizkor.org/features/qar/qar00.html.
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prominent organizations in the denialist movement' 03), and members of the
Nizkor team have directly corresponded with deniers and challenged their
views.'
Whether such approaches are efficient is a different matter. In this context, it is useful to return to the distinction between leaders and followers of
the denialist movement. 05 Where the leaders are concerned, the confrontational approach, due to their particular motivations, less likely to achieve
significant results: a denier with political reasons stands to gain little by
accepting the truth, and a denier who seeks publicity stands to lose
everything.
Even there, exceptions exist. In 2010, when Rabbi Jack Bemporad and
American law professor, Marshall Breger, organized a visit of several
imams and Muslim scholars to the Auschwitz concentration camp, the participation of Yasir Qadhi, Dean of Academics at the Al Maghrib Institute in
New Haven, triggered criticism:1 06 Qadhi had told an audience in 2001, that
Hitler "never intended to mass-destroy the Jews" and encouraged them to
read a book about the "hoax" of the Holocaust. 07 But the journey appears
to have had a profound effect on Qadhi, who afterwards declared, in response to the criticism, that "[i]t was even more necessary for me to go and
see how wrong I was."

08

The motivation of the followers of the denialist movement justifies a
greater emphasis on the confrontational approach. A follower who repeats
phrases of denial under the influence of a group of like-minded people
might act differently if removed from his peers and in the context of a
serious conversation. A follower who accepts statements of denial because
he believes them to be true shows that, on a basic level, truth still has value
to him; and confrontation with evidence might not be an entirely fruitless
undertaking.
And initiatives have come into existence whose work carries an impact
in this context. Some of these are dedicated to offering affected persons a
way out of adherence to the extreme right (where Holocaust denial has traditionally found a strong base). In Sweden and Germany, for instance, the
103. For more detail, see Lipstadt, supra note 1, at 137.
104. Cf. David Irving. Correspondence, THE NIZKOR
.nizkor.org/hweb/people/i/irving-david/correspondence.
105. See supra text after note 66 et seq.

PROJECT,

http://www

106. Hilary Leila Krieger, Imams' trip to Auschwitz Brings Hope, THE JERUSALEM
Aug. 22, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/International/Imams-trip-to-Auschwitzbrings-hope.
107. Rob Harris, A Marked Man in America (video), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/video/magazine/I 00000000725852/yasir.html.
108. Krieger, supra note 106.
POST,
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"Exit" programme helps members of these groups leave their communities.1 09 In Denmark, the project "Deradicalisation - Targeted Intervention,"
run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, seeks to help young people quit environments that are extremist in nature."1 0
These initiatives have shown some success: five years after the German version of "Exit" had been established, its director stated that the project had helped 225 persons to leave environments of this kind."' These
projects, however, are not specifically designed as options for dealing with
denialism, although debating the "ideology" of these groups is often part of
the programme.112
A more direct approach is taken by the German society, "FUr die
Zukunft lernen" (Learning for the Future).1 3 For the past twenty years, its
president, Werner Nickolai, has been involved in a project that seeks to
inform young people about the Holocaust. Every year, Nickolai, a professor
at the Catholic University of Applied Sciences in Freiburg, embarks on a
ten-day journey to the Auschwitz concentration camp, along with young
people from the extreme right, including juvenile prisoners.1 4 During their
stay, they engage in maintenance work at the remains of the camp, but also

109. See Former Extremists Will Get Help to Quit, STOCKHOLM NEws, Apr. 11,
2011, http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=7038; Anne Martens, Bye-bye
Kameraden!, TAz, Dec. 1, 2005, at 22.
110. DANISH MINISTRY FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS, Deradicalisation- Targeted Intervention, Introduction to a Pilot Project, http://www.sm.dk/data/Lists/Publikationer/Attachments/554/Folder%2ODeradicalisation%20Targeted%20Intervention.pdf; see also
DANISH MINISTRY FOR REFUGEE, IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION AFFAIRS, The Challenge of Extremism, Examples of deradicalisationand disengagement programmes in
the EU, Oct. 2010.
111. Mirtens, supra note 109.
112. Cf DANISH MINISTRY FOR REFUGEE, IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION AFFAIRS, supra note 110, at 12, 18, 26.
113. See Werner Nickolai et al., FOR DIE ZUKUNFT LERNEN, http://www.fuer-diezukunft-lernen.de.
114. Bettina Schaefer, LASS UNS OBER AUSCHWITZ SPRECHEN, http://www.lassuns-ueber-auschwitz-sprechen.eu/multiplikatoren.html; A Spalinger, Was hat Auschwitz jungen Skinheads zu sagen? Ein deutscher Verein versucht "rechter" Gewalt zu
begegnen, NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG, June 9, 2000; Michael Werner, Zum Glack war ich
in der Zeit nicht dort, SODWESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 15, 2000, http://www.fuer-diezukunft-lernen.de/swbericht.html; Werner Nickolai, Die inneren Wunden werden nie
ganz heilen, NEUE CARITAS, 9/2010, http://www.caritas.de/neue-caritas/heftarchiv/jahrgang2010/artikel/dieinnerenwundenwerdennieganzheilen.
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meet survivors of the Holocaust."' As in most of the other projects, participation is a voluntary commitment." 6
Prior to his academic career, Nickolai had been a social worker in a
juvenile prison'" 7-an experience which may have helped him keep his expectations on a realistic plane. He is aware of the limitations of the project
and points out that the young people with whom he travels do not necessarily understand the link between the mistreatment of Jews at Auschwitz and
the mistreatment of minorities today." 8 But there is one tangible result:
Nickolai notes that there had not been a single case in which the persons
accompanying him still adhered to Holocaust denial after former concentration camp prisoners had personally told them about the gas chambers.'19
It would appear that personal confrontation with the facts was instrumental for this result-as, arguably, was the encounter with inescapable visual evidence. It is of importance to Nickolai that "all senses" of the young
people are addressed,1 20 and the experience of Yasir Qadhi appears to underline this aspect of the confrontational approach. After his journey to the
death camp, Qadhi stated that every denier should be given a free ticket to
visit Auschwitz "because seeing is just not the same as reading about it."l21
The confrontational approach, then, is not devoid of merit. But it requires accurate distinctions if it is to lead to convincing results. Even where
followers of the movement are concerned, the efficiency of, for example, a
debate on the underlying crimes can be questioned, if the audience is still
embedded in their peer groups and generally accepting of their influence.
A direct encounter with visual evidence and a meeting with survivors
may be a more persuasive option. Taking young extremists out of their
comfort zone-which was, after all, defined by parameters set by their particular background-may well have been a significant contributory factor in
the success of the Nickolai project in spite of its avowed intention to inform, rather than to shock.1 22
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CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

The fact that criminalization has become a popular option to counter
denialism is not difficult to understand. In the presence of deeply offensive
statements about the suffering of millions, the call for retribution is not
unexpected.
But the legal sanction has shortcomings that cannot be ignored; prominently, the possibility of a clash with human rights, including freedom of
expression, but possibly also with other rights that the leading human rights
treaties seek to protect. And criminalization tends to have a segregating
effect: by targeting statements about certain crimes at the expense of others,
it engages in the questionable business of constructing a hierarchy of
suffering.
The alleged efficiency of criminalization is a further point allowing for
critical assessment. The danger exists that the exclusionary effect of
criminalization plays rather into the mind-set of the movement; it is one of
the cornerstones of the denialist ideology that its supporters are seen as
martyrs who resist the "conformist conspiracy" of mainstream history.
If the law is not the solution, alternatives must be considered which
promise greater efficiency. Various options have been explored in this article, but the most convincing approach may well require a combination of
several methods. It is suggested that the following aspects have an impact
on this consideration.
Firstly, genocide and Holocaust denial take place in different societies
and in different contexts. The identification of the most appropriate ratio of
methods to counter denialism is therefore strongly dependent on situational
parameters. The urgency and widespread nature of denial in some societies
may require more of a communal effort, including heightened emphasis on
public education and the establishment of dedicated institutions, which are
capable of reaching members of all strands of society. If denialism is promoted merely by a minority, the focus might shift to dealing with the leaders and followers of that movement.
Secondly, not all deniers are cut from the same cloth. The leaders and
creators of denialism act from motivations that differ markedly from those
at the bottom of the movement. Genuine curiosity may occasionally be encountered in the latter group, but is nearly always absent in the former, and
the appropriate methods of dealing with the conduct of deniers thus have to
vary accordingly.
Thirdly, even within a particular target group, a careful assessment of
the available methods is indispensable. The impact of an academic article
on a juvenile delinquent with extremist right-wing tendencies may be
doubted; the showing of a film on the atrocities might be more effective;
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confrontation with actual physical evidence of international crimes and
meetings with survivors have carried a convincing measure of success in
the past. Fine-tuning these approaches is key to the development of a persuasive response, and that, in turn, requires a certain insight into the psychological conditioning of the perpetrator. Since the disassociation from
"mainstream society" is often a core aspect of the ideology of deniers, the
success of any option to counter denialism cannot be measured by the degree to which their exclusion from the community has been achieved-rather
by the degree to which society has been able to effect their reintegration.
Applying these considerations may seem a fair amount of effort-more
perhaps than an increased focus on education of the general public would
require, and the question may arise whether people who indulge in denialism "deserve" this amount of consideration.
But this view fails to appreciate the context of these measures and their
consequences. Their primary objective is still the countering of denial, and
their principal thrust is unchanged: it lies in the protection of truth, of memory, and of the dignity of the survivors of crimes whose gravity is not subject to reasonable doubt.

